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Solving the Procedural Quagmire for
Testing Reverse Payment Settlements
Richard McMillan, Jr., Mary Bram & M. Brinkley
Tappan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Patent disputes between branded and generic drug
manufacturers governed by the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (“the Hatch-Waxman
Act”)1 are often settled under terms that contemplate some
payment of money by the branded firm in exchange for the
generic firm’s agreement to withdraw wholly or partially from
the market. For years, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
has attempted to label these “reverse payment settlements” as
anticompetitive under Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act2 and Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 3
Such settlements have also been attacked in Congress;
legislation has been introduced to prohibit reverse payment
settlements on grounds that they retard the growth of less
expensive generic drugs and increase health care costs for
American consumers.4 Most recently, the Department of
 2010 Richard McMillan, Jr., Mary Bram & M. Brinkley Tappan.
* Richard McMillan, Mary Bram and Brinkley Tappan practice law in
Washington, D.C. The opinions expressed in this article are their own, and are
not offered on behalf on any other firm or organization. In addition, the views
expressed are based upon U.S. legal principles, and therefore may not be
applicable in jurisdictions outside the United States, such as in the European
Union.
1. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
355 and 35 U.S.C. 271(e) (2006)).
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
3. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006). According to FTC Commissioner Jon
Leibowitz, “[e]liminating these pay-for-delay settlements is one of the most
important objectives for antitrust enforcement in America today.” Jacqueline
Bell, FTC, Calif. Launch Reverse Payment Challenge, LAW360, Feb. 3, 2009.
4. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. (as
introduced, February 3, 2009).
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Justice (DOJ), in response to invitation by the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, has endorsed the proposition that
reverse payment settlements should be deemed presumptively
unlawful under a Section 1 rule of reason analysis, and
permitted only in rare circumstances.5
Courts to date have largely rejected these criticisms.
Practical-minded judges, even while expressing concerns
regarding the risks posed by reverse payment settlements,
have recoiled from the daunting prospect of probing the
justifications for intricate settlements of complex patent
disputes. Instead, courts have generally defaulted to the
proposition that patent law, which contemplates legal
monopolies by patent holders, should trump inconsistent
antitrust concerns.6 Government enforcement agencies, on the
other hand, have continued to press their case that reverse
payment settlements presumptively violate antitrust laws, but
have yet to propose a meaningful set of procedures for how a
rule of reason analysis should proceed in such circumstances or
how any such presumption might be overcome.
The state of this debate is unsatisfactory because it has
tended to be framed by two extremes—those proposing
presumptive validity and those proposing presumptive
invalidity, with neither side proposing attractive methods for
assessing the presumption or appropriate standards for
rebutting the presumption. More sensible treatment of reverse
payment settlements might be possible if the courts were able
to settle on a thoughtful and effective method for applying
antitrust scrutiny to these types of settlements, but to date, a
suitable formula has proven elusive.
As a matter of theory, there is credible cause for antitrust
concern. Within the framework of Hatch-Waxman in which
these settlements occur, there are substantial incentives that
tend to encourage reverse payment settlements between

5. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation at 9–
10, 19–32, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer, AG, No. 05-2851cv(L) (2d Cir. July 6, 2009) [hereinafter DOJ Brief].
6. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 202
(2d Cir. 2006). More recently, however, the Second Circuit has indicated a
willingness to revisit the issue of how to balance antitrust and patent law in
connection with reverse payment settlements. See Ark. Carpenters Health &
Welfare Fund v. Bayer, AG, No. 05-2851-cv(L), 2010 WL 1710683, at *7 (2d
Cir. Apr. 29, 2010).
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branded and generic firms even when there will be negative
impacts on competition and consumers. The branded company
is defending “monopoly” profits, and thus has a huge incentive
not to put that monopoly at risk by seeing the case through to a
judgment that could potentially invalidate the patent. By
comparison, the generic firm—whose entry into the market will
predictably drive down prices—often anticipates lower
profitability as a result and thus more limited upside
opportunity. Accepting a slice of the branded company’s
monopoly profits in settlement entails less risk then a fullfledged market entry while still guaranteeing the generic some
substantial return on investment. As courts and commentators
have recognized, it is foreseeable that in some cases it would
even be in the branded company’s self-interest to offer the
generic a reverse payment higher than the total economic
benefit the generic might hope to achieve by successfully
entering the market.7
The fact that a reverse payment settlement may be in the
self-interest of the two participants does not, of course,
automatically dispose of antitrust concerns. Indeed, any
“contract, combination . . . or conspiracy”8 that runs afoul of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act will typically have been perceived
by participants to be in furtherance of their mutual selfinterest. That is usually the reason for the agreement in the
first place. But while parties to a reverse payment agreement
might be well satisfied, it is relatively easy to imagine
circumstances in which consumers—the intended beneficiaries
of antitrust law—would not be.
Yet the perceived obstacles to addressing this dilemma
remain unresolved. The bedeviling factors continue to be the
myriad possible fact patterns in which the reverse payment
concept might be used and the seeming unworkability of
assessing the real thought processes that motivated the
agreement in any particular instance. Faced with their own
7. If a reverse payment settlement exceeds the profit the generic hoped
to realize, but is still substantially below the profit that the branded firm
hopes to maintain, it could be in the branded firm’s self-interest to offer such a
settlement and in the generic’s self-interest to accept it. See DOJ Brief, supra
note 5, at 5 (quoting In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187,
209 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also, Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment
Settlements Violate the Antitrust Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 489, 503 (2007).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
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inability to define rules flexible enough to deal with the diverse
fact patterns that are encountered, and their own reluctance to
second-guess the motivations of parties who agree to settle
complex litigation, courts to date have defaulted either to the
position of essentially declaring a pox on all reverse payments
(by labeling them per se illegal),9 or throwing up their hands by
declaring all disputes within the “exclusionary zone of the
patent” off limits to antitrust scrutiny.10 But while either the
per se or “zone of exclusion” approaches may have the
questionable benefit of allowing courts to avoid becoming mired
in the hard work of careful antitrust analysis, neither does
justice to the clear need for such analysis in appropriate cases.
This article proposes a middle ground between these two
extremes. We believe the courts should look more seriously at
the reverse payment scenario, but should do so with a set of
existing and established tools that would allow effective
scrutiny of reverse payment settlements without unduly
chilling the desirability of such settlements in some
circumstances. This would require recognition by litigants that
their own litigation case assessments may be open to scrutiny,
to the extent permitted under normal discovery procedures, if
the parties choose the reverse payment method of settlement.
At the core of this proposal is the need for courts to sanction
these discovery tools to examine the actual settlement analyses
and thought processes of the litigants in reaching their
settlement. Such examination allows the most accurate
assessment of the real motivations driving the settlement and
is the only way to avoid the impossible task of undertaking a de
novo study of a complex patent dispute and second-guessing the
litigants’ own assessments of that dispute through an
independent jury trial.
While it may seem worrisome to some that a party’s
settlement communications may be discoverable in an antitrust
challenge to a reverse payment settlement, current discovery
and evidentiary principles, if properly applied, should already
provide adequate protection to the settlement parties. Litigants
can have no valid expectation that the communications

9. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th
Cir. 2003).
10. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d
1323, 1333–36 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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between them are always privileged from antitrust analysis.
While Federal Rule of Evidence 408 limits admissibility in
some circumstances, this bar is not absolute.11 Moreover, in
some extreme cases, even internal communications within one
party or the other may be subject to evaluation under
exceptions to rules governing attorney-client privilege.
II. REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS: A BY-PRODUCT
OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
Reverse payment settlements occur in pharmaceutical
patent infringement litigation when a patent owner of a
pioneer drug and a generic drug manufacturer settle the suit by
agreement that the generic company will cease or delay market
entry of its generic in exchange for a settlement payment from
the pioneer. Generally, the terms of the settlement also allow
the patent owner to preserve the validity of the patents at issue
in the infringement suit and both the patent owner and the
generic drug manufacturer avoid further costly litigation. The
Hatch-Waxman Act provides the regulatory context under
which reverse payment settlements arise.
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic drug
manufacturer seeking approval of its generic drug by the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) can file an Abbreviated New
Drug Application (ANDA).12 The ANDA requires that the
generic manufacturer demonstrate bioequivalence between its
generic drug and an FDA-approved pioneer drug.13
Additionally, the ANDA requires that if there are potentially
relevant patents that will not have expired as of the anticipated
market entry date, the generic manufacturer must certify to its
belief that such patents are “invalid or not infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the generic drug.”14 This
certification is called a “Paragraph IV Certification,” and is
deemed an act of infringement that can be challenged by the
pioneer in court.15
The generic manufacturer must notify the patent owner of
11. FED. R. EVID. 408.
12. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j) (West 1999 & Supp. 2009).
13. § 355(j)(2)(A).
14. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
15. Mona Gupta & William C. Youngblood, High-Stakes ANDA
Pharmaceutical Litigation and Paragraph IV Challenges, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY SUPPLEMENT TO THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, April 21, 2008.
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its Paragraph IV Certification. The patent owner then has
forty-five days to bring a patent infringement suit against the
generic manufacturer.16 If suit is filed, FDA approval of the
ANDA is postponed for either thirty months from the
notification date or until, within the thirty- month period, a
court issues a decision regarding validity or infringement of the
patent.17
Paragraph IV Certification is attractive to generic
manufacturers because the first ANDA filer receives a 180 day
exclusivity period within which it is the only company allowed
to market the generic drug.18 Notified patent owners usually
bring suit, however, and most often settle with the first ANDA
filer. Those settlements typically take one of two forms: (1) the
generic pays some amount to the patent owner, albeit perhaps
less than the patent owner originally demanded, and proceeds
to enter the market; or (2) the patent owner pays some amount
to the generic, in exchange for the generic’s agreement to delay
market entry (the so-called “reverse payment” scenario). In the
former case, the settlement is justified on normal grounds,
namely, it resolves uncertainty regarding the patent rights and
avoids the potentially enormous cost and time associated with
litigation. In the latter case, however, the assertion of patent
rights by the branded firm was not sufficient to prevent market
entry by the generic. Rather, it took the assertion of patent
rights plus some payment of money to secure that result. The
issue is whether that payment, together with the remaining
terms of settlement, fairly addresses not only the private
interests of the litigants but also the public interests and
requirements of both patent and antitrust law.
III. ANTITRUST SCRUTINY OF REVERSE PAYMENT
SETTLEMENTS
Reverse payment settlement agreements commonly attract
antitrust scrutiny from private plaintiffs or government
regulators, and sometimes both. Given that a generic drug is,
by definition, comparable to the pioneer drug with regard to
“dosage form, strength, route of administration, quality,

16. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
17. Id.
18. Gupta & Youngblood, supra note 15.
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performance characteristics and intended use,”19 there is no
question that a generic drug competes with a name-brand drug
when introduced to the market. Such competition has the
potential to reduce prices and benefit consumers. When the
possible introduction of a generic drug is forestalled by a
confidential settlement between two competing drug
companies, consumers may become naturally suspicious, if the
pioneer remains the only seller in the market and/or prices
remain higher than they would have had the two companies
been forced to compete for sales. Although these settlements
have been attracting antitrust scrutiny for years, the courts
have not developed a common analytical approach.
On one side of the current debate regarding the
appropriate form of analysis is the Sixth Circuit’s seminal
opinion in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation.20 In that
case, the Court found the reverse payment settlement at issue
to be per se unlawful.21 The court found the agreement “a
horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the market
for Cardizem CD throughout the entire United States, a classic
example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.”22
One distinguishing feature of Cardizem, however, was that
the generic agreed not to introduce products that fell outside
the scope of the patent, and the case has been distinguished on
that basis.23 No other appellate court to date has followed the
Sixth Circuit. Rather, a new trend has developed in favor of an
analysis of the “exclusionary zone” of the patent. In Valley
Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, the Eleventh Circuit
refused to uphold the district court’s characterization of the
settlement agreement as per se illegal because a patent was
involved.24 Noting that a patent provides a lawful right to
exclude and that the exclusionary right may be exercised in
many ways, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court
19. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Abbreviated New Drug
Application
(ANDA):
Generics,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelop
edandApproved/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDA
Generics/default.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2010).
20. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
21. Id. at 900.
22. Id. at 908.
23. Holman, supra note 7, at 545–46 (2007).
24. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th
Cir. 2003).
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erred in failing to consider the “exclusionary power” of the
patent at issue.25
Two cases in 2005 provided further traction for the
“exclusionary zone” analysis. In In re Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litigation, the Second Circuit professed to apply a
rule of reason analysis to balance (1) the adverse effect on
competition; (2) the pro-competitive “redeeming virtues” of the
action; and (3) whether the same pro-competitive benefit could
have been achieved through other means.26 Although the trial
court that heard the initial stage of the underlying patent
litigation held Astra-Zeneca’s patent invalid,27 the Second
Circuit refused to presume invalidity and afforded great
deference to the power of the patent throughout its analysis.28
Noting that the settlement agreement had not exceeded the
“exclusionary zone” of the patent by affecting other products,
foreclosing completely competition in the tamoxifen market, or
barring other generics from seeking to enter the market, the
court attributed any adverse effects to the power of the patent,
rather than to an anticompetitive agreement between AstraZeneca and Barr.29 On that basis, it upheld the decision of the
trial court dismissing the case.
In Schering-Plough Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission,
the Eleventh Circuit declined to apply a traditional per se or
rule of reason analysis, opting to follow Valley Drug by
examining “(1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the
patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that
scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects.”30 Once
again, the court paid great deference to the power of the patent,
and justified each term of the settlement on those grounds.
The “exclusionary zone” analysis was most recently
adopted by the Federal Circuit in In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation.31 In that case, plaintiffs

25. Id. at 1306.
26. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 385 n.13
(2d Cir. 2005), amended by 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006).
27. Id. at 386.
28. Id. at 392–93 & n.22.
29. See id. at 403.
30. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005)
(citing Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (11th Cir.
2003)).
31. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323,
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argued on appeal that the district court had failed to apply a
proper rule of reason analysis because of its emphasis on the
“exclusionary zone” of the patent.32 In response, the Federal
Circuit stated that “the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate
that the Agreements had an anti-competitive effect on the
market for ciprofloxacin beyond that permitted by the
patent.”33 It therefore concluded that it was unnecessary to
proceed to the second and third steps of the rule of reason
analysis, because plaintiffs failed to meet their burden in
showing anti-competitive effects.34 The court rejected plaintiffs’
assertion that a proper rule of reason analysis should focus on
the amount of the reverse payment and the strength of the
underlying patent, and adopted the “exclusionary zone”
reasoning espoused by the Second and Eleventh Circuits.35 On
that basis, it affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’
claims.
Most recently, however, the Second Circuit has indicated a
possible willingness to revisit its holding in Tamoxifen. In
Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer (a
companion case to the Cipro litigation in the Federal Circuit),36
the court requested briefing by DOJ.37 DOJ responded by
suggesting that the court revisit its earlier holding, and quoted
extensively from that holding. In particular, DOJ noted that in
Tamoxifen, the Court had observed that if the patent is found
invalid, “the total profits of the patent holder and the generic
manufacturer on the drug in the competitive market will be
lower than the total profits of the patent holder alone under a
patent-conferred monopoly.”38 Accordingly, it is “therefore
likely to be in the patent holder’s economic interest ‘to pay
some portion of that difference to the generic manufacturer to
maintain the patent monopoly market for itself,’” particularly if
the payment is “larger than the generic drug firm’s expected

1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
32. Id. at 1331.
33. Id. at 1332.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1334–1335.
36. No. 05-2851-cv(L), 2010 WL 1710683 (2d Cir. Apr. 29, 2010).
37. See DOJ Brief, supra note 5.
38. Id. at 5 (quoting In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d
187, 209 (2d Cir. 2006)).
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gain from litigating the validity issue.”39
DOJ then proposed that all reverse payment settlements
be considered presumptively unlawful, but that the parties be
permitted to overcome the presumption by showing “a
reasonable explanation of the payment, so that there is no
reason to find that the settlement does not provide a degree of
competition reasonably consistent with the parties’
contemporaneous evaluations of their prospects of litigation
success.”40 DOJ characterized this as just the straightforward
application of a rule of reason analysis of competitive impacts.41
But because, under DOJ’s formulation, the analysis would be
tied to “the parties’ contemporaneous evaluations of their
prospects of litigation success,”42 it presents a conundrum for
how it could best be applied.
After receiving the input from DOJ, the Second Circuit
recently affirmed the reverse payment settlement at issue in
Bayer, proclaiming itself bound by the analysis in Tamoxifen.43
However, it expressly invited the plaintiffs to seek review en
banc, in light of the “exceptional importance” of the antitrust
implications of “reverse exclusionary payment settlements.”44
Hinting that further reshaping of the law may be required, the
panel suggested there were “compelling reasons to revisit
Tamoxifen.”45 Thus, weaknesses in the prevailing “exclusionary
zone” analysis may yet auger some further evolution of the law,
and if the Second Circuit does change course en banc, the issue
may well reach the Supreme Court.46

39. Id. at 5–6 (quoting Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at
209).
40. Id. at 10.
41. Id. at 9–10.
42. Id. at 10.
43. Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer, AG, No. 05-2851cv(L), 2010 WL 1710683, at *5, *7–8 (2d. Cir. Apr. 29, 2010).
44. Id. at *1.
45. Id. at *8.
46. Bayer was a companion case to the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2008), and a new direction by the Second Circuit would could well trigger a
conflict between the circuits that would be appropriate for Supreme Court
review.
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IV. WEAKNESSES OF THE “EXCLUSIONARY ZONE”
ANALYSIS
As an analytic tool, the “exclusionary zone” analysis suffers
from numerous drawbacks. First, it tends to be almost entirely
circular. There is no “exclusionary zone” of an invalid patent.
Rather, the “exclusionary zone” of a patent is by definition
dependent upon whether the patent is valid—the very issue
disputed in the underlying infringement case but assumed in
an “exclusionary zone” analysis.
Moreover, at issue in an antitrust challenge to a reverse
payment settlement are not the rights arising from the patent
but the rights arising from a private settlement agreement.
That agreement is a contract, a typical object of antitrust
scrutiny. Contract law does not allow parties to resurrect an
otherwise invalid patent and make it valid. As the DOJ
explained in its brief to the Second Circuit in Bayer, the Patent
Act “offers the patentee a choice between exercising its
statutory privilege to protect its interests through litigation to
enforce the patent—with the attendant risk that the patent
may be invalidated—and relying on private measures that
avoid the risk of patent invalidation but provide no antitrust
immunity.”47 By essentially presuming patent validity, courts
applying an “exclusionary zone” analysis are saying that if
there is any possibility that the settlement is justified by patent
rights, then the whole antitrust inquiry must be scuttled.
Despite its weaknesses, it is not difficult to understand
why courts have embraced the “exclusionary zone” analysis as
a lesser of evils. Nearly all courts and scholars acknowledge
that because settlement agreements are generally to be
encouraged in litigation, it would be inappropriate always to
deem them per se unlawful under the antitrust laws.48
47. DOJ Brief, supra note 5, at 14.
48. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 390–
391 (2d Cir. 2005), amended by 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006); Erica N.
Anderson, Note, Schering the Market: Analyzing the Debate over ReversePayment Settlements in the Wake of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003
and In re Tamoxifen Citrate Litigation, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1028–30 (2008)
(discussing different scholarly approaches for dealing with reverse payment
settlements). Moreover, even a rule of reason analysis is problematic, as some
of these same commentators suggest. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC,
402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005). Just as importantly, a rule of reason
analysis could implicate the “trial within a trial” problem that so
fundamentally is driving the courts toward the exclusionary zone approach.
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However, when courts reject the black and white litmus test of
a per se rule, they have found little to fall back on. The specter
of a rule of reason analysis applied to highly technical patent
litigation has proved daunting. Expressly or implicitly, courts
have recoiled at the prospect that after a settlement meant to
resolve complex patent litigation, they must oversee a process
in which a jury wades back into the underlying merits of the
same dispute (in a “trial within a trial”), and then proceeds to a
further level of complexity analyzing antitrust concerns. At
some level, the courts seem to be saying that considerations of
practicality must play a role.
The FTC and DOJ have even recognized these worries as
legitimate, at least up to a point. The DOJ has specifically
foresworn the need for a trial within a trial to determine patent
validity: “Requiring a court to determine whether the patentee
would have prevailed . . . would unduly complicate the
litigation by requiring at least a mini-trial of the patent issue
in the antitrust case, and likely more.”49 And yet, even DOJ
offers no suggestions for how this “mini-trial” might be avoided.
Rather, DOJ acknowledges that in most cases, the presumption
that reverse payment settlements are invalid can be overcome
only “by showing that the settlement preserved a degree of
competition reasonably consistent with what had been expected
if the infringement litigation went to judgment.”50 How this
might be determined, however, is for the most part not
addressed.
There is a need for some procedural framework to assess
the “but for” world avoided by the settlement, i.e., the issue of
what would have been “expected if the infringement litigation
went to judgment.”51 We believe there are established tools
available for this task. Before analyzing these tools, however,
we must first look more closely at what analysis should
actually be required in order to properly assess the legality of a
reverse payment settlement under the antitrust laws.

See infra text accompanying notes 56–58.
49. DOJ Brief, supra note 5, at 25–26 (internal citation omitted).
50. Id. at 30.
51. See id.
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V. THE ANALYTIC TEST FOR EVALUATING REVERSE
PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
While a complete ban of reverse payment settlements
might appeal to antitrust purists, such a drastic measure is
both unnecessary and undesirable. A complete ban would
frustrate the general policy of courts to encourage settlements
of protracted litigation. Reverse payment settlements help to
manage legal costs and mitigate risk associated with jury trials
in patent cases, while potentially bridging the gap in
settlements that, particularly if made in the context of some
broader arrangement, could offer pro-competitive benefits when
considered overall. However, courts have found it extremely
difficult to identify any suitable procedure by which reverse
payment settlements could be effectively analyzed. Although
the potential for antitrust abuse is recognized, the lack of a
practical means for assessing this potential has stymied most
courts to date. The problem has been noted, but the remedy has
proven elusive.
The comprehensive itemization of all factors that might
affect a proper antitrust analysis of reverse payment
settlements is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say
that at least at a general level, rule of reason standards are
well developed, and we are confident that courts could refine
them with more specificity in the particular context of reverse
payments as the cases progressed. The central difficulty,
however, is that challenging a reverse payment settlement
necessarily requires an analysis of the bona fides of that
settlement. It is therefore worth at least some brief analysis of
the kinds of issues that might be implicated in this
environment.
The touchstone of any rule of reason analysis is impact on
competition. If courts, in response to the demands of
government regulators, begin to look more closely at reverse
payment settlements, touchstones may develop to facilitate the
rule of reason analysis. A reverse payment in excess of the total
profits the generic might have achieved if market entry had
occurred might, for example, require particularly close
scrutiny. Where the full terms and impact of settlement are
less clear, however, courts have recognized the potential need
to analyze the probability that extended litigation would have
produced a more pro-competitive outcome (i.e., beneficial to
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consumers) than the proposed settlement.52 This necessarily
requires at least some evaluation of the parties’ potential
prospects in the litigation, because it is the projected outcome
of that litigation which defines the “but for” world to which the
settlement must be compared.
In addition, there must be some market and profitability
analysis. A sensible rule of reason analysis would consider not
only the scope of the patent rights, but also the profitability of
the market in which those rights could be exercised. Both of
these are facts that the parties would have considered
themselves when they negotiated the settlement. Parties would
not enter into a reverse payment settlement without assessing:
(1) the strength of the patent; (2) the profit the generic would
have earned had it entered the market; (3) the size of the
reverse payment; and (4) any other terms of the settlement or
conditions of the negotiation that would tend to affect the
balance.53
At least as a theoretical matter, the evaluation of these
factors should permit a court to determine whether a reverse
payment settlement was a reasonable conclusion to the
underlying patent litigation, or whether it is indicative of a
“pay-for-delay” agreement not justified by the merits of the
patent. DOJ, for example, has stated that the presumption of
unlawfulness would be overcome if the settlement provides “a
degree of competition reasonably consistent with the parties’
contemporaneous evaluations of their prospects of litigation
success.”54
While seemingly straightforward, however, DOJ’s
formulation masks hidden difficulties. These difficulties vary
depending upon whether the generic’s market entry is
completely prohibited or only delayed under the terms of
settlement. A threshold question, for example, is whether a
reverse payment settlement should ever be deemed reasonable
if it allows no generic competition until the patent term has
expired. One could imagine some limited circumstances where
rule of reason standards might be satisfied—e.g., where both
parties believed there was overwhelming evidence that the
patent was valid and infringed and the reverse payment was

52. See Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 429 F.3d at 386.
53. See, e.g., id. at 391–392; Anderson, supra note 48, at 1028–31.
54. DOJ Brief, supra note 5, at 10.
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very low—but this would probably be the unusual case.
We believe that in most cases, courts confronting reverse
payment settlements will be able to identify at least some procompetitive features. Eventual entry by the generic may be
permitted, or at minimum, the generic may be cross-licensed to
sell some “generic” version of the branded firm’s product. In
such circumstances, the inquiry will turn on the size of the
reverse payment, the terms of market entry by the generic, and
the likely litigation outcome had no settlement been reached. A
sliding scale might be envisioned. At one end of that scale are
cases involving perceptions by the parties of a high likelihood of
patent validity, and relatively low reverse payment amounts.
At the other end are weak patent rights, high monetary
payments, and substantial foreclosure of market entry by the
generic.
Concrete examples help to illustrate. Assume for example
that a settlement was premised on the conclusion, shared by
both parties, that the underlying patent had a substantial
likelihood (i.e., 75% or greater) of being upheld as valid. So long
as any reverse payment was small relative to the projected
profitability of the pioneer and generic, a settlement might
seem justified. The generic under these facts was very unlikely
to have achieved market entry through litigation, and the
reverse payment amount might be found reasonable when
considered in this context and against the fact that it offsets
some potential litigation costs and business uncertainty risks
associated with “irrational” litigation outcomes. This latter
factor is frequently overlooked. Patent jury trials are often
criticized for their unreliability,55 and settlements that
overcome that unreliability when the parties have a shared
view of the likely outcome should be respected.
If, on the other hand, the pioneer came to the conclusion
that the patent in all likelihood would be found invalid, and the
pioneer then simply proceeded to buy the generic out of the
market by paying it something close to what the generic would
have obtained in profit by entering the market, antitrust
review does seem appropriate. In that case, a hefty reverse
payment would be tantamount to an acknowledgement that the
pioneer had no real patent rights but rather could keep the

55. See, e.g., Brad Stone, Blackberry Smackdown; Wrangling Over Patents
Is Worrying Users and Investors, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 12, 2005, at 48.
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generic out of the market only by paying the full value of the
generic’s likely gain by entering the market. A court could
conclude that this was not a reasonable settlement, but a
straightforward “pay-for-delay” arrangement, and therefore, an
antitrust violation.
Analyzing specific examples is one thing. The texture and
complexity of all possible reverse payment scenarios is quite
another. It will not be unusual, for example, for the parties to
have very different estimations of success, with perhaps each
party believing it would be likely to prevail if the case
ultimately went to trial. Profit estimates extending into the
future might also be highly variable and disputed. There is no
“formula” that will adequately measure all possibilities under
all circumstances. Nor will courts ever be able to predict with
certainty either the likely litigation outcome or the future
market behavior.
However, these precise factors will have been analyzed by
both parties in reaching their settlement. Even though exact
outcomes could not be known, the probabilities of all likely
outcomes should have been assessed. As a matter of theory, it
therefore seems neither unfair nor particularly difficult to
compare the choices made in the settlement agreement with
the actual beliefs that drove those choices. In fact, the
subjective assessments of the parties, driven by detailed
evaluation of the facts and law by knowledgeable counsel, may
offer the most reliable tools for assessing the antitrust impacts
of the agreement.
While difficulties will remain under any approach, the
courts should aspire to some solution to the largely unworkable
“exclusionary zone” standard that most courts currently follow.
The risks of reverse payment settlements are evident. The
severe weaknesses of the “exclusionary zone” test are also
evident. A new and better construct needs to be crafted.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
Courts following the “exclusionary zone” rule have
imagined that in the absence of a per se approach, analysis of
the reasonableness of any particular settlement would
necessarily mean becoming bogged down in a “trial within a
trial.” Under such an imagined approach, the whole issue of
whether the patent is valid has to be litigated (despite the
settlement) in order to determine if the settlement was
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reasonable.56 This would require claim construction,
assessment of all prior art, evaluation of the range of other
invalidating defenses, and potentially opening the issue of
inequitable conduct before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) as well. Most importantly, it would
permit a jury to reach its own determination of these issues,
thereby potentially second-guessing how either party to the
litigation actually evaluated them in fact. This “trial within a
trial” approach disregards entirely the benefits of settlement
and the rights of parties to make their own judgments about
which settlements are reasonable, and requires a full-scale
vindication of those judgments before a lay jury.
On closer analysis, however, we believe the real problem is
not what to analyze, but how to make the analysis. Under our
approach, the focus of the rule of reason analysis would be
limited to how the parties themselves perceived and evaluated
the underlying dispute, and determined the terms of
settlement. A key benefit to this approach is that it would take
into account a much smaller and potentially more reliable set of
facts—namely, what the parties themselves believed and how
they evaluated the settlement.57
From an analytic perspective, the focus on the parties’ own
assessments seems entirely appropriate. Litigants analyze
their litigation positions in far more detail than any court could
do in the span of a trial. In patent litigation, including the
months leading up to the litigation, it is not uncommon for
millions of dollars in legal and expert fees to be expended. This

56. “In its decision that led to the Eleventh Circuit appeal in ScheringPlough, the FTC concluded that ‘it would not be necessary, practical, or
particularly useful for the Commission to embark on an inquiry into the
merits of the underlying patent dispute when resolving antitrust issues in
patent settlements.’” In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544
F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2003
WL 22989651, slip op. at 19 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003)).
57. We do not intend to suggest that probing the parties’ settlement
evaluations will be a simple exercise. Indeed, once it was understood that
settlement intent could be evaluated in some circumstances, we would expect
parties to adopt counter-measures to protect against potential discovery
probes. Exchanges during the course of some settlement discussions may be
guarded, and parties might be expected in any event to avoid incriminating
statements in their documentation. But judicial procedures provide
mechanisms for deciding upon appropriate discovery in these circumstances,
and while some complexity will still be involved, we believe our approach
offers enormous savings in both time and effectiveness.

MCMILLAN_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

818

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

6/10/2010 3:25 PM

[Vol. 11:2

purposely intensive analysis provides the most secure baseline
for analyzing the real merits of the dispute.
Although there is little doubt that the most thorough
understanding of the facts of any particular dispute is often
held by the litigants themselves, when the litigants settle,
there ordinarily is a cloak of confidentiality that the litigants
are entitled to rely upon to shield their settlement discussions
from further scrutiny. In the reverse payment scenario, the
trick then is to find a way that respects the legitimate rights of
confidentiality, while still permitting some outside scrutiny
where appropriate.
Luckily, there is an already established set of tools in our
court system that can provide this middle ground. In the
approach outlined below, an antitrust plaintiff challenging a
reverse payment settlement would proceed in a three-step
fashion. First, it could gather publicly available information.
Second, it could invoke the principles of Federal Rule of
Evidence 408 during discovery, to obtain information about the
settlement agreement.58 Finally, if the court had strong
suspicions that there had indeed been an antitrust violation, it
could allow the plaintiff to pursue privileged information about
the settlement by invoking the crime-fraud exception to
privilege. This would have to be done with care, however, and
only in extraordinary circumstances, as discussed below.
These steps should proceed seriatim. The Rule 408 inquiry
would be best undertaken after the challenge to the reverse
payment settlement had been framed by publicly available
information, when the exact purpose for the Rule 408 inquiry
could be defined on the basis of such information. Similarly,
invocation of the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client
privilege would require a prima facie showing of wrongdoing (in
this case, an alleged antitrust violation) that could be made out
only if sufficiently probative facts had been uncovered from
public information and the court-supervised Rule 408 inquiry.
We analyze each of the three steps below.

58. Rule 408 allows admission of evidence of compromise or offers to
compromise when the evidence is offered for a purpose other than to prove
“liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a claim that was disputed as to
validity or amount, or to impeach through a prior inconsistent statement or
contradiction.” FED. R. EVID. 408.
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A. PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION
To learn more about the patent at the center of a
settlement, plaintiffs in an antitrust challenge should first be
required to look at public information available from several
sources. First, the FDA publishes all approved generic and
pioneer drugs in the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
Equivalence Evaluations, also known as the Orange Book.59
Pioneer drug entries identify relevant patents. The complaint
in the underlying patent infringement case would also identify
the patents alleged to have been infringed. Copies of the
patents are obtained from the USPTO.60
Evidence related to the strength of the patents is available
in the prosecution histories of the patents. A prosecution
history includes all of the papers filed by the Applicants and
the USPTO during prosecution of the patent application.
Importantly, the prosecution history includes all Office Actions
issued by the USPTO and all amendments and responses to
Office Actions filed by the Applicants. Office Actions could
provide a basis upon which a patent could potentially be found
invalid. Using this source, an antitrust plaintiff could ascertain
at least some important facts concerning the likelihood of a
patent’s validity and proffer evidence of patent invalidity.
Depending on the point at which the pioneer and the
generic settled, court filings in the underlying patent
infringement case might also provide an antitrust plaintiff with
detailed analysis regarding the validity of the patents at issue.
This would be particularly true for cases that progressed to the
point of summary judgment; motions at that phase of trial
could present the best arguments for invalidity and validity,
respectively. Thus, depending upon the progress of the case
prior to settlement, an antitrust plaintiff might be able to
access very useful evidence regarding the strength of the
patents at issue.
While a reverse payment settlement agreement is typically
confidential, an antitrust plaintiff might also obtain details
regarding the settlement agreement in annual reports filed by
59. See OFFICE OF GENERIC DRUGS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE
EVALUATIONS
(2010),
available
at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/eclink.cfm.
60. United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Full-Text and
Full-Image Databases, http://patft.uspto.gov/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
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public companies with the SEC. Such reports sometimes
include the amount and frequency of payments from the
pioneer drug company to the generic manufacturer, terms
agreed to by the generic manufacturer in consideration for
payment, and other ancillary agreements entered into at the
time of the reverse payment settlement agreement. For
example, in one of its annual reports, Barr Laboratories, Inc.
(“Barr”) discussed its reverse payment settlement agreement
with Bayer AG and Bayer Corporation (collectively “Bayer”),
including the amount of the payment and the terms of a related
supply agreement.61
Court filings in a civil action initiated by the FTC or DOJ
could also provide an antitrust plaintiff with evidence
pertaining to the terms of the settlement, the beliefs of
settlement participants regarding the settlement, product
revenues and projections, the anticompetitive effects of the
settlement, and other information. Although government
regulators generally initiate non-public investigations in the
first instance, if the pioneer drug company and generic
manufacturer refuse to sign a consent order, the FTC has been
willing to file an action in a U.S. district court seeking
injunctive relief. In that case, some fruits of the non-public
investigation become public. The FTC recently initiated such
an action after a non-public investigation of a reverse payment
settlement.62
There may be a variety of additional information available
as well, especially for important drugs.63 This might include
press releases, trade publications, financial analyst reports,
analyst calls with management, FDA dockets, and FTC
reports.64

61. Barr Labs., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K405) (Sept. 29, 1997),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/10081/0000950123-97008183.txt.
62. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 08-cv2141-RBS
(D.D.C.
Feb.
13,
2008),
available
at
ttp://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0610182/080213complaint.pdf.
63. C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New
Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629,
646–47 (2009).
64. Id.
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B. INVOKING FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 408 DURING
DISCOVERY
Although a significant amount of information about a given
settlement may be available in the public domain, it may be
that this information by itself will be insufficient in many cases
to fully resolve antitrust concerns. However, publicly available
information should provide an appropriate baseline for seeking
court approval of further discovery directed at the
reasonableness of the settlement. This would be supervised
under the strictures of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and 408. Two sorts of
materials could be sought—i.e., the settlement agreement
documents themselves and communications between the
parties concerning the settlement, including negotiations.
Federal Rule of Evidence 408 allows for the admissibility of
evidence of compromise negotiations, so long as the evidence is
not offered to prove “liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a
claim” that was the subject of the negotiations.65 The purpose of
this stricture is to ensure that evidence of compromise cannot
be admitted to prove the validity or invalidity of the underlying
claim in a follow-on action to reassert or rely upon that claim.66
In a follow-on antitrust action, however, it is not the validity or
invalidity of the underlying claim that is at issue, but only the
parties’ subjective perceptions of that claim. Those perceptions
may be entirely in error, but the bona fides of the settlement
for antitrust purposes would nevertheless turn on those
perceptions, rather than the real merits, of the underlying
claims. Discovery could therefore properly be limited to facts
concerning the settlement agreement and negotiations bearing
on whether or not the parties intended to affect an illegal
restraint on trade.67 Discovery directed strictly toward whether
there was a patent infringement would generally not be
allowed. As one court has stated, evidence of compromise
negotiations is likely to be admissible where “the settlement

65. FED. R. EVID. 408.
66. See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note.
67. See id. The advisory committee provides examples of courts admitting
evidence of an insurer’s settlement offer to prove the insurer’s bad faith, id.
(citing Athey v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 234 F.3d 357, 362 (8th Cir. 2000)), and
finding Rule 408 “inapplicable when the claim is based upon a wrong . . .
committed during the course of settlement negotiations,” id. (citing
Uforma/Shelby Bus. Forms, Inc. v. NLRB, 111 F.3d 1284, 1293 (6th Cir. 1997).
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communications at issue arise out of a dispute distinct from the
one for which the evidence is being offered.”68
The court would nevertheless retain a gate-keeping role in
assessing this issue. Thus, an antitrust plaintiff should be
required, based on public information, to demonstrate some
reasonable basis for its antitrust theory, and be able to explain
the specific features of the settlement negotiations that require
discovery in order to substantiate that claim. Courts evaluating
the admissibility of evidence under Rule 408, for example, often
examine not only the purpose for which the party seeks to
admit the evidence, but whether admission of the evidence
would undermine the policy behind Rule 408, which is to avoid
chilling settlement negotiations.69 In a case in which one party
sought to admit evidence from a mediation to establish the
amount in controversy for federal jurisdiction purposes, the
court admitted such evidence.70 The court reasoned that
“concern that one’s adversary will use statements during
negotiation as proof of liability or wrongdoing, not concern that
it will use them as proof of the amount in controversy, is the
primary obstacle to forthright negotiation discussions.”71
Similarly, admitting evidence of a settlement agreement
between a pioneer and a generic manufacturer for purposes of
an antitrust analysis of the settlement would be unlikely to
chill settlement negotiations in an underlying patent
infringement case. To the extent there was a chilling effect, it
would most likely be manifested in extra care by the drug
companies to avoid the kind of discussion that might raise
antitrust concerns. Only companies that intended to effect an
anti-competitive agreement would need to worry about such
“chilling effects.” For this reason, admitting evidence of the
settlement negotiations should be permissible under Rule 408.
Passing muster under Rule 408 would entitle the antitrust
plaintiff to discovery of non-privileged communications
regarding the settlement. These communications would be a

68. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Watts Indus., Inc., 417 F.3d 682, 689 (7th Cir.
2005).
69. See, e.g., Affiliated Mfrs, Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 56 F.3d 521,
526 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The policy behind Rule 408 is to encourage freedom of
discussion with regard to compromise.”).
70. See Molina v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. CV 08-04796 MMM (FMx), 2008
WL 4447678 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008).
71. Id. at *13.
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further source of potentially rich information by which the bona
fides of the settlement could be evaluated. With the terms of
the settlement agreement and underlying, non-privileged
discussions exposed to discovery, the parties would be able to
develop their arguments about the nature of the settlement,
particularly on the basis of the amount of the reverse payment,
the stage at which the parties settled, the length of the
negotiations, and whether the generic is permitted to license
technology or enter the market prior to the expiration of the
pioneer’s patent. A reasonably rich antitrust analysis could be
performed with this information, and an antitrust plaintiff
whose case at this juncture was still based only on conjecture
and suspicion should be entitled to go no further. However, if
discovery of non-privileged settlement materials establishes a
prima facie case of a potential antitrust violation, further
inquiry will be appropriate, as discussed below.
C. USING THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION TO PRIVILEGE
Rule 408 itself permits a government prosecutor (such as
the DOJ or FTC) to utilize settlement agreements and
negotiations for any purpose in connection with a criminal
inquiry. Similarly, the law has long permitted confidentiality
claims based on attorney-client privilege to be overcome if the
communications were in furtherance of a crime or fraud.72 This
“crime-fraud” exception is used sparingly, and should be.
Nevertheless, if used with great care, it could hold benefits for
evaluating reverse payment cases in which there appears to be
prima facie evidence that the antitrust laws have been violated.
The antitrust laws provide for both civil and criminal
remedies, and intentional antitrust violations qualify as
“criminal” for purposes of the common law crime-fraud
exception to privilege.73 Therefore, an antitrust plaintiff could
potentially use the crime-fraud exception to delve even more
deeply into what the parties were really intending, by piercing
the privilege between the settling companies and their
attorneys. This would require some prima facie showing of
criminal intent by the challenging party, but should not depend

72. Auburn K. Daily & S. Britta Thornquist, Has the Exception Outgrown
the Privilege?: Exploring the Application of the Crime-Fraud Exception to the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 583, 584 (2003).
73. See In re Burlington N., Inc., 822 F.2d 518, 524–525 (5th Cir. 1987).
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upon whether actual criminal charges have in fact been
brought by antitrust enforcement authorities. To establish its
basis for invocation of crime-fraud, a plaintiff would be
required to undertake a two-part showing. First, the plaintiff
must convince the court to undertake an in camera review of
the documents in question. This requires a factual showing
“adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person
. . . that in camera review . . . [might] reveal evidence to
establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception applies.”74
Second, the court may order production of otherwise
privileged documents on the basis of in camera review, but only
if it finds that a prima facie antitrust violation has been made
out.75 Moreover, only those documents found to have been
written “in furtherance” of that violation will be ordered to be
produced.76 Under this procedure, therefore, the court retains
considerable discretion as to whether the privilege should be
pierced, and what specific communications should be produced.
We recognize that the very suggestion that the crime-fraud
exception could play a meaningful role here will strike some
readers as extreme. But it should not. First, under our
proposal, the court would never get to a crime-fraud analysis
unless and until the antitrust plaintiff had demonstrated a real
basis for its claim. Suspicions or even “possible” inferences
would not be enough. The crime-fraud case law requires that
the plaintiff demonstrate a prima facie case that, as applied
here, the antitrust laws have been violated. Because this
violation must be criminal in nature to trigger the crime-fraud
exception, it necessarily has an intent element, and the prima
facie case would require a demonstration of such intent.77 We
presume that in most cases, this would be an extremely
difficult hurdle to surmount.
A plaintiff seeking to invoke the crime-fraud exception

74. In re Ditropan XL Antitrust Litig., No. MDL 06-1761 JSW (EDL),
2007 WL 3256208, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2007) (quoting United States v.
Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989)).
75. See Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 241 F.R.D. 480, 489–490 (N.D.
Ill. 2007).
76. Mark A. Thornhill et al., Peering into Lawyers’ Files: Prosecutors’ Use
of the Crime or Fraud Exception 7 (2005) (unpublished paper presented to
ABA Section of Natural Res., Envtl. & Energy Law), available at
http://www.abanet.org/environ/committees/environcrimes/thornhill.pdf.
77. See Abbott Labs., 241 F.R.D. at 490.

MCMILLAN_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

6/10/2010 3:25 PM

SOLVING THE PROCEDURAL QUAGMIRE

825

thus faces a stiff burden requiring that it both exhausts less
intrusive discovery tools and establishes the necessary showing
of intent that would be the touchstone for any alleged criminal
antitrust violation. A plaintiff seeking to invoke the crimefraud exception should first be required to review publicly
available information and exhaust appropriate discovery tools
permitted by Rule 408. Among other things, this may reveal
important dimensions of the underlying settlement
negotiations. While communications between a party and its
attorney are generally privileged, communications between two
opposing parties negotiating a settlement agreement generally
are not, absent unusual circumstances.78 Discovery of such
information could benefit either party. While a plaintiff will
seek evidence of apparently conscious antitrust violations,
defendants in many cases will be able to show that their
negotiations focused on solutions that should not raise, and
were not believed to raise, valid antitrust concerns. In the
latter instance, the court would properly deny a plaintiff’s
request for waiver of attorney-client privilege under the crimefraud exception.
In the exceptional case where a basis for crime-fraud
review does exist, there would be additional protections
available by reason of the requirement that a judge first review
evidence from the settlement negotiations in camera.79 Such
evidence might include each company’s assessment of its
litigation risks, advice from counsel about the likelihood of
success based on the strength of the patent at issue, and
assessments by each party of their potential gains or losses
depending on the potential outcomes of the case. All of this
evidence would allow a court to assess whether the parties
reached a reasonable settlement based on the legitimate factors
under consideration at the time, or whether the settlement was
simply a veiled agreement by one party to stay out of the
market in exchange for an unreasonable reverse payment. If
78. See 1 EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND
WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE 484 (5th ed. 2007).
79. In camera reviews are sometimes conducted by a judge other than the
one presiding over the underlying case, to prevent prejudice to the producing
party in the event the evidence does not meet the requirements for admission
under the crime-fraud exception. Given that antitrust cases are commonly
adjudicated through bench trials, it would be reasonable for a drug company to
request that a separate judge review any evidence produced for in camera
review.
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the court was satisfied that the settlement was reasonable and
legitimate, the privileged information submitted for in camera
review would never be revealed to plaintiffs, because it would
necessarily be insufficient to establish an antitrust crime. If the
court were still suspicious of the settlement after reviewing the
privileged evidence, and believed that the totality of the
evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of an
antitrust violation, it could allow examination of privileged
documents deemed to be “in furtherance” of the crime.80
The production of such otherwise privileged documents to
the party challenging a reverse payment settlement does not
resolve that challenge. It simply makes available a broader set
of facts for assessing it. What the parties tell each other during
settlement discussions is not always (or even often) what they
are telling themselves internally. Thus, in order to really
understand the true intent of parties to a reverse payment
settlement, it might be necessary to discover their internal
thought processes. However, the parties to the reverse payment
settlement would retain their rights to prove in any way they
considered appropriate that their settlement was reasonable or,
at a minimum, not an intentional violation of the antitrust
laws.
Crime-fraud procedures are well established. They are
reserved for exceptional circumstances, and would be here as
well. Only where a plaintiff could demonstrate a prima facie
case of antitrust violation would the crime-fraud exception be
triggered, and only communications “in furtherance of” the
violation could be discovered. If used carefully and judiciously
as the third step in a multi-step process for analyzing reverse
payment settlements, this mechanism would hold real potential
for allowing litigants to get to the heart of disputed matters
without need of the trial within a trial that has so terrified the
courts to date.
VII. CONCLUSION
We believe our proposal responds to an important
limitation in the manner in which courts assess reverse
payments in the settlement of patent litigation in the drug
field. Growing acceptance of a rule premised on the
“exclusionary zone” of a patent is based on reasoning that is
80. See Abbott Labs., 241 F.R.D. at 487, 490 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
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entirely circular. It presumes the validity of the patent, even
though it was the very uncertainty of that issue that drove the
reverse payment settlement. Our approach offers a more
suitable and thorough analysis, while avoiding the
countervailing risks of a “trial within a trial” which seems to
have scared off most courts from undertaking any fulsome
antitrust evaluation of reverse payment settlements. The
approach proceeds in three phases: public data must first be
examined; non-privileged, private information may then be
examined as determined by the court; and finally, upon a real
prima facie showing of potentially criminal behavior, attorneyclient privilege may be pierced and the examination permitted
to include specific privileged documents that the court selects
based on its in camera review. The inquiry can be stopped at
any stage, if parties to the settlement make a sufficient
showing of the bona fides of their agreement. On balance, this
process ensures that principles of both the patent laws and the
antitrust laws are considered, and put in harmony.

